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This paper shows that the private incentive for mix-and-match compatibility in
system markets diverges from the social planner’s incentive if competing suppli-
ers are asymmetric in production cost or product quality. There can be too much
or too little compatibility when the market is served by fully integrated system
suppliers. Also, the market outcome involves socially too much incompatibility
in the form of exclusive technological alliances when the market is composed of
independent component suppliers. These results contrast with the standard one
obtained in the symmetric setup and shed new light on public policy towards
compatibility, technological alliances, and bundling practices in system markets.
(JEL: D42, L12)
1 Introduction
Many goods are used in systems composed of several complementary compo-
nents. Examples are widespread: bolts and nuts, which together provide fastening;
computer hardware and software, which provide information processing; network
platforms and contents, which provide various information/entertainment services.
In such a market, an issue that is important not only for business strategy but also for
public policy is whether to make components produced by different firms compat-
ible or make them incompatible with each other. If components are incompatible,
the competition is system versus system and consumers have no choice but to buy
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a system whose components are provided by a single firm. If components are com-
patible, consumers can mix and match their preferred components to build their best
system.
Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989), hereafter MR&E, were
the first to analyze this kind of mix-and-match compatibility in system markets
with horizontally differentiated components. They examine firms’ incentive for
compatibility and its welfare implication. The main conclusion of their analyses is
that compatibility is beneficial to the firms as well as to the society. Compatibility
softens price competition, since a firm cannot internalize the full benefit of its
price cut with compatible components; and it also enhances social welfare by
increasing the variety of systems in the market. See also Einhorn (1992) for a similar
analysis in the context of vertically differentiated markets, where compatibility
softens competition by increasing the degree of quality differentiation. Matutes and
Regibeau (1992) allow firms to price a bundle of their components separately from
individual components. Boom (2001) analyzes firms’ product-characteristic choices
prior to compatibility decisions. These results imply that the private market incentive
coincides with the social incentive and therefore public policy need not intervene in
firms’ decisions on compatibility.
Given that MR&E’s analyses are restricted to the case of symmetric firms, it
would be interesting to see whether their result still holds when competing firms are
asymmetric in production cost or product quality. In fact, most, if not all, system
markets in the real world are characterized by competition among asymmetric
firms with unequal market shares. We can easily find examples where asymmetric
firms with different market shares compete with compatible components, such as
the present hi-fi and electric appliance industries. There also exist examples of
asymmetric firms competing with incompatible components, such as the digital
camera industry, where some memory cards are compatible only with certain types
of digital cameras. For example, the xD-Picture Card, developed by Olympus and
FujiFilm, is used only for digital cameras produced by the two firms, and the
Memory Stick, developed by Sony, is used only for its own digital cameras. Note
that, however, some memory cards, such as the Compact Flash Card, are compatible
with digital cameras produced by many different manufacturers.
This paper examines how the firms’ incentive for compatibility and its welfare
effect are affected by the presence of asymmetry in system markets. Analyzing
a stylized model built on Matutes and Regibeau (1988), we find that, contrary to
MR&E’s result obtained in the symmetric setup, the market incentive for compat-
ibility may diverge from the social optimum if one firm has sufficiently large cost
advantages over all components. First, for a moderate level of asymmetry there can
be excess compatibility in the market.1 The firms opt for compatibility with higher
equilibrium prices, as in the symmetric case. Compatibility, however, involves too
1 A similar point has been noted by Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Boom
(2001). However, their results critically depend on the nonnegligible cost of attaining
compatibility. Indeed, ignoring the cost of compatibility, their models yield that com-
patibility is always (weakly) welfare-improving. Assuming away the cost of attaining
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much inefficient production by the high-cost firm, in comparison with incompati-
bility. This is because the inefficient firm’s market share tends to be greater under
compatibility, where cost advantages or disadvantages between the firms are split
over components and therefore their effect on the market shares is weaker than in
the case of incompatibility, and also because price competition is less intense under
compatibility with imperfect appropriation of the price-cutting benefit. This welfare
loss from inefficient production outweighs the gain from increased product variety
under compatibility. Second, for a high level of asymmetry the market outcome may
involve socially too much incompatibility. Here, the intensity of price competition
is lower under incompatibility rather than compatibility. This is because the market
boundary is shorter under incompatibility than under compatibility, and so the firms’
price-cutting incentives are lower under incompatibility. This market-boundary ef-
fect dominates the imperfect-appropriation effect in this case, and therefore the
firms prefer incompatibility over compatibility. Social welfare, however, is larger
under compatibility, with more efficient production as well as more diverse systems.
Note that the latter result depends on a specific assumption on the distribution of
consumer preferences, while the former result is quite robust to model specification.
This point will be discussed in more detail later, in section 6. If cost advantages
are shared between the firms across components, on the other hand, the firms prefer
compatibility and it is socially desirable as well, exactly the same as the standard
result with symmetric firms. Here, compatibility increases firm profits by relaxing
price competition due to the imperfect-appropriation effect, and also improves social
welfare by allowing the firms to specialize in components they can produce more
efficiently.
We also examine the case where the market is served by several independent com-
ponent suppliers. As noted by Matutes and Regibeau (1988, p. 228), with separate
ownership across components there is no difference in the degree of internalization
of complementarity between compatibility and incompatibility, and so (symmetric)
firms are indifferent between the two regimes. With asymmetric firms, however,
we find that the market outcome leads to too much incompatibility. Efficient com-
plementary suppliers have joint incentives to enforce compatibility only between
their components and not with those produced by other, inefficient firms; this deci-
sion may be implemented by means of an exclusive technological alliance. In fact,
inefficient firms also benefit from incompatibility. This is mainly because incompat-
ibility relaxes the intensity of price competition by reducing the equilibrium market
boundary. Incompatibility, however, is detrimental to social welfare, since it does
not allow consumers to mix and match their preferred components, and also softer
price competition under incompatibility allows inefficient firms to produce more
than under compatibility.
Work on mix-and-match compatibility in asymmetric system markets is rather
scant in the literature. Farrell, Monroe, and Saloner (1998) show that incompatibility
compatibility, our result gives a sharper and direct welfare comparison between com-
patibility and incompatibility.
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may prevail in the market with more than two varieties of each component and
cost heterogeneity across the firms. Choi (1996) examines the relation between
compatibility and R&D incentives in a mix-and-match model with cost asymmetry.2
Assuming identical components or homogeneous consumer preferences, however,
their analyses focus only on the effect compatibility or incompatibility has on the
cost of production or the level of R&D, failing to capture its effect on system variety
and consumer surplus. Using a mix-and-match model with differentiated products,
we show clearly how the variety-enhancing effect interacts with the cost effect when
the competing firms are asymmetric, and how the model’s policy implications differ
from those obtained in the early literature.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Sections 3 and 4 characterize equilibria under compatibility and incompatibility and
derive the main results when the market is served by integrated system suppliers.
In section 5 we extend the analysis to the case of independent component suppliers
with separate ownership. Section 6 discusses the robustness of the results. Section 7
concludes with discussions on policy implications regarding compatibility, bundling,
and entry deterrence in system markets.
2 The Model
The model is essentially the same as the one in Matutes and Regibeau (1988), except
for asymmetries in production cost across firms.3 Consider a market consisting of
two integrated system suppliers and a continuum of consumers. Each firm produces
two complementary components, A and B, that are used on a one-to-one basis to
form systems. Assume that the two firms produce both components at constant
marginal costs without fixed costs. The firms’ products are horizontally differenti-
ated. Following Matutes and Regibeau (1988), we assume that consumers of mass 1
are uniformly distributed on the unit square, where firm 1 is located at the origin
and firm 2 at the point of coordinates (1, 1).4 Consumers have unit demands for
the system, and a consumer’s location on the square denotes her most preferred
specification of the two components. The net surplus of a consumer who buys one
2 Also related is the paper by Denicolo (2000). He analyzes a structurally asym-
metric setup with one generalist firm offering both components of a system competing
against two specialists each supplying one component only, and shows that the gener-
alist firm may have an incentive to choose incompatibility.
3 Note that representing asymmetry between firms in terms of quality rather than
cost would not change the results qualitatively, provided the quality of a system is
taken to be the sum of component qualities and consumers have identical preferences
for quality.
4 This assumption is not totally innocuous under asymmetry, since with asymmet-
ric firms the relative intensity of competition under compatibility and incompatibility
depends on the shape of the consumer distribution. Nevertheless, it serves as a natu-
ral benchmark for the purpose of comparison, given that most of the previous works
are based on the same model setup. Later we will discuss the robustness of our results
with respect to this assumption.
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unit of component A from firm i and one unit of component B from firm j is given
by
V − λ(dAi + dB j) − Pij , i, j = 1, 2 ,
where V is the reservation price for a unit of the system (common to all consumers),
dzi is the distance between the consumer’s preferred specification of component z
and the specification of component z sold by firm i (i = 1,2, z = A, B), and Pij is the
total price the consumer pays for a system composed of firm i’s component A and
firm j’s component B. The parameter λ measures the degree of horizontal differen-
tiation between the two firms’ components, which is normalized to 1 for analytical
simplicity. A consumer located at the point of coordinates (x1, x2) has her preferred
component A that is x1 away from the specification of firm 1’s component A and
her preferred component B that is x2 away from the specification of firm 1’s com-
ponent B. Similarly, the distances between the consumer’s preferred components
and firm 2’s components are 1 − x1 and 1 − x2. Individual consumers will buy a unit
of the system, provided they obtain a nonnegative net surplus. We assume that V is
sufficiently large so that the market is covered in equilibrium (i.e., every consumer
makes a system). We will discuss the cases of partial participation in section 6.
We solve for a perfect Nash equilibrium in the following two-stage game. In the
first stage, each firm decides whether to make its components compatible with its
rival’s ones. In the second stage, the firms compete in price, given the first-stage
compatibility decisions. We assume that the first-stage compatibility decisions are
irreversible (or very costly to reverse) in the later stage. They may involve funda-
mental choices on technologies and system designs. Two cases can be considered
regarding the mechanism by which compatibility is attained in the market. The first
is the consensus case, where each firm’s proprietary technologies are protected by
intellectual-property rights and cannot be used by the rival without the righthold-
er’s consent. In this case compatibility requires bilateral agreements between the
firms to make their components compatible with each other or to adopt a common
technology. The second is the adapter case, where compatibility can be enforced
unilaterally by a single firm using an adapter. It is natural to expect that compati-
bility is more likely to be attained under the adapter case than the consensus case.
To focus on the pure welfare implication of firms’ incentives for compatibility, we
assume that the cost of achieving compatibility is negligible in both cases.5
3 Complete Cost Leadership
We first consider the case where one firm has cost advantages in both components.
Let us assume, for simplicity, that firm 1’s marginal cost is c > 0 and firm 2’s
marginal cost is zero for both components.
5 Adding a small cost of achieving compatibility in our model would not change
the results qualitatively.
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Price Equilibria under Incompatibility and Compatibility. When the components
produced by different firms are incompatible, the competition is system versus
system and what matters to consumers in their purchasing decision is the aggregate
price of a system. A consumer located at (x1, x2) will be indifferent between the two
systems if
x1 + x2 + P1 = 2 − x1 − x2 + P2 ,
where Pi represents the price of firm i’s system. For P1 ≥ P2, the firms’ demands
and profits are
D1 = 12
(
1 − P1 − P2
2
)2
, π1 = 12 (P1 − 2c)
(
1 − P1 − P2
2
)2
,
D2 = 1 − 12
(
1 − P1 − P2
2
)2
, π2 = P2
[
1 − 1
2
(
1 − P1 − P2
2
)2]
.
Each firm will choose its system price to maximize profits given the rival’s price.
The equilibrium can be easily derived from the first-order conditions.
When the components produced by the two firms are compatible with each
other, the competition is component versus component. Consumers can mix and
match components produced by different firms, and therefore individual consumers’
choices of components are entirely independent of each other. Consumers who are
indifferent between firm 1’s component A and firm 2’s component A are character-
ized by
x1 + pA1 = 1 − x1 + pA2 ,
and similarly for component B the indifferent consumers are characterized by
x2 + pB1 = 1 − x2 + pB2 ,
where pzi represents the price of firm i’s component z (i = 1, 2, z = A, B). The
firm i’s demand for component z is given by
Dzi = 12 [1 − (pzi − pz j)] ,
and the firms’ profits are
π1 = 12 (pA1 − c)[1 − (pA1 − pA2)] +
1
2
(pB1 − c)[1 − (pB1 − pB2)] ,
π2 = 12 pA2[1 − (pA2 − pA1)] +
1
2
pB2[1 − (pB2 − pB1)] .
Each firm’s maximization problem is separable in components. Focusing on the
case where both firms are active in equilibrium (i.e., c ≤ 3), the equilibrium is
derived from the first-order conditions. We summarize the equilibrium values under
the two regimes in Table 1.
Private and Social Incentives for Compatibility. Comparing the firms’ profits under
the two equilibria, we can find that there exists a cutoff value c∗E such that the
profit of firm 2 (the efficient one) is larger under compatibility for c < c∗E and
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Table 1
Equilibrium Values for the Case of Complete Cost Leadership
Incompatibility Compatibility
Pe1 = 74 c + 14 + 14
√
c2 − 2c + 9 pez1 = 1 + 2c3
Pe2 = 54 c − 54 + 34
√
c2 − 2c + 9 pez2 = 1 + c3
s1 = 132
(
1 − c + √c2 − 2c + 9 )2 sz1 = 12 − c6
s2 = 1 − s1 sz2 = 1 − sz1
π IN1 = 1128
(
1 − c + √c2 − 2c + 9 )3 πC1 = (1 − c3 )2
π IN2 = 132 (c2 − 2c + 19)
√
c2 − 2c + 9 − 132 (c − 1)(c2 − 2c − 41) πC2 =
(
1 + c3
)2
CSIN = V − 148
[
c3 − 3c2 + 69c − 19 − (c2 − 2c − 33)√c2 − 2c + 9 ] CSC = V − c + c218 − 52
W IN = V − 112
[
c3 − 3c2 + 6c + 8 − c(c − 2)√c2 − 2c + 9 ] WC = V − c + 518 c2 − 12
Note: si : market shares; CS: consumer surplus; W : social welfare.
under incompatibility for c > c∗E , and similarly for firm 1 (the inefficient one) with
a different cutoff value c∗I . Note that the cutoff value is lower for the efficient firm
(c∗E < c∗I ). So, the two firms have a common interest in achieving compatibility when
the cost asymmetry is small (c < c∗E), and in achieving incompatibility when the cost
asymmetry is large (c > c∗I ). When the cost asymmetry is moderate (c∗E < c < c∗I ),
however, the inefficient firm favors compatibility while the efficient one is against it.
This result clearly shows that the firms’ incentive for compatibility can be affected
by the degree of cost asymmetry between competing firms.
First note that, as pointed out by MR&E, compatibility creates a sort of im-
perfect appropriation, leading to softer price competition and higher profits than
does incompatibility.6 The firms’ incentive to cut price tends to be smaller under
compatibility, since some of the benefits from a price cut accrue to a firm’s rival,
while under incompatibility a price-cutting firm can capture the full benefits of its
price cut.7 This imperfect-appropriation effect basically increases firms’ incentive
to choose compatibility.
In the presence of cost asymmetry, however, the firms’ compatibility incentives
are also influenced by the following factors. First, the efficient firm’s cost advan-
tage is greater under incompatibility (system competition) than under compatibility
(component competition), and this allows it to get a larger market share and profit
under incompatibility than under compatibility. For a given c, the efficient firm’s
6 If the firms behave as local monopolies, compatibility also increases demands by
allowing consumers to mix and match their preferred components. At the moment, we
focus on the case where the market is fully covered in equilibrium. We will discuss in-
formally the cases of partial participation with this demand-shifting effect in section 7.
7 For instance, when a firm decreases its price for component A, it increases the
market share for its whole system under incompatibility. Under compatibility, however,
a similar price cut increases its demand for component A only.
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Figure 1
Marginal Gains from a Price Cut under Compatibility and Incompatibility
cost advantage is 2c under system competition (incompatibility), while it is reduced
to c under component competition (compatibility). With this asymmetry-enhancing
effect the efficient firm tends to favor incompatibility, while the opposite is true for
the inefficient firm. Obviously, this effect gets larger as the degree of asymmetry
increases.
Second, the intensity of price competition is also affected by the gain in demand
following a price cut, which is proportional to the length of the market boundary,
given the distribution of consumer preferences. In the present setup with the unit-
square distribution, the equilibrium market boundary becomes shorter as the cost
asymmetry increases under incompatibility, while it is independent of the degree
of cost asymmetry under compatibility (see Figure 1). This market-boundary effect
is reflected in the convexity of firm i’s demand function Di in its own price under
incompatibility (contrasted with the linear demand function under compatibility).
Also, the corresponding competition-softening effect is confirmed by the fact that
an increase in cost asymmetry tends to increase the equilibrium prices the more,
the higher the degree of cost asymmetry. This leads to less intense competition
under incompatibility, and its effect is increasing in the degree of cost asymmetry.
Also noteworthy is that it is due to this market-boundary effect and the resulting
convex demand functions that market cornering never occurs under incompatibility.
Here the market boundary becomes so small that the firms’ price-cutting incentive
disappears at some level of cost asymmetry. With compatibility, however, the equi-
librium market boundary is constant irrespective of the degree of cost asymmetry,
and therefore the efficient firm corners the market for a sufficiently large degree
of cost asymmetry. It should be noted that this market-boundary effect crucially
depends on the distribution of consumers in the product space. For instance, for the
case where consumers are distributed on a circle the equilibrium market boundary
will be of equal length under compatibility and incompatibility, and therefore there
is no market-boundary effect. Also, if the market-boundary effect is absent or negli-
gible, we may have market-cornering equilibria even under incompatibility (see the
analysis of the octagon distribution case in the supplementary appendix). Note that,
however, the preceding imperfect-appropriation and asymmetry-enhancing effects
remain valid irrespective of the consumer distribution.
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Now we can provide the economic reasoning behind the above result. When the
cost asymmetry is small (c < c∗E), the asymmetry-enhancing and market-boundary
effects are both negligible and the firms’ price-cutting incentives are mainly af-
fected by the imperfect-appropriation effect. So both firms prefer compatibility, as
in the standard model. When the cost asymmetry is large (c > c∗E), however, the
market-boundary effect is so strong that even the inefficient firm is better off with
incompatibility, which yields higher equilibrium prices and profits. The efficient
firm obviously favors incompatibility, on account of the asymmetry-enhancing ef-
fect. So, in this case both firms have a common interest in choosing incompatibility.
Finally, when the cost asymmetry is intermediate (c∗E < c < c∗I ), the asymmetry-
enhancing effect exceeds the market-boundary effect, so the efficient firm prefers
incompatibility, while the inefficient still favors compatibility due to the imperfect-
appropriation effect. So, in this case the two firms’ interests conflict with regard to
compatibility.8
Assuming that the first stage of the game is played sequentially – firm 2 (the effi-
cient one) moves first, and then firm 1 (the inefficient one) follows – the equilibrium
of the entire two-stage game is characterized in the following lemma.9 Obviously,
in the consensus case the market outcome is determined by the efficient firm’s
preference for compatibility, and the opposite holds for the adapter case.
LEMMA 1 A unique perfect Nash equilibrium exists, where compatibility prevails
for c ≤ c∗E (c∗I ) and incompatibility prevails for c ≥ c∗E (c∗I ) in the consensus (adapter)
case.
We now examine the welfare implication of the market outcome. Comparing
social welfare under the two equilibria leads to the following result.
LEMMA 2 There exist two cutoff values c1 and c2 (c1 < c∗E < c2 < c∗I ) such that
social welfare is larger under incompatibility for c ∈ (c1, c2) and under compatibility
for c ∈ [0, c1) ∪ (c2, 3).
To get some insight regarding this welfare result, it is useful to see how (in)com-
patibility affects the consumer gross utility (GU), average system price (AP), and
total production cost (TC) (see Figure 2). First, note that compatibility, by increasing
product variety, tends to increase consumer gross utility. This mix-and-match effect
is very strong when the market is more or less equally divided in equilibrium (i.e.,
the cost asymmetry is small), yielding a larger gross utility under compatibility. This
effect becomes smaller as the cost asymmetry increases, and in fact, for a sufficiently
high level of cost asymmetry, consumer gross utility is larger under incompatibility,
with less asymmetric market shares in equilibrium. Second, the average system
8 This possibility of firms’ conflicting interests in compatibility with asymmetric
costs has been pointed out by Matutes and Regibeau (1988, section 6). What is new,
however, is the possibility of firms’ mutual agreement on incompatibility for a suffi-
ciently large degree of asymmetry.
9 The assumption of sequential moves allows us to sidestep the problem of multiple
equilibria and the related coordination issue in the simultaneous-move game.
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price (weighted by the equilibrium market shares) tends to be higher (lower) under
compatibility when the cost asymmetry is small (large). This result is a direct
consequence of the relation between the relative intensity of competition under
the two regimes and the degree of cost asymmetry. Third, the total production
cost, a measure of production efficiency in the present setup, is closely related to
the size of the inefficient firm’s market share in equilibrium, which depends on
the intensity of price competition as well as the degree of asymmetry. We find
a nonmonotonic relationship between the relative production efficiency of the two
regimes and the degree of asymmetry. When the cost asymmetry is small, production
efficiency is higher under incompatibility, due to the asymmetry-enhancing effect.
When the cost asymmetry is high enough, however, the market-boundary effect
dominates the asymmetry-enhancing effect, leading to more efficient production
under compatibility rather than incompatibility.
Note that social welfare is related to consumer gross utility and production effi-
ciency (the price effect is canceled out). When the cost asymmetry is small (c < c1),
the mix-and-match effect is stronger than the production-efficiency effect, leading to
a larger welfare under compatibility than under incompatibility. When the cost asym-
metry is moderate (c1 < c < c2), however, the production-efficiency effect dominates
the mix-and-match effect, yielding the opposite result (i.e., incompatibility with
more efficient production is socially desirable even though it reduces product var-
iety). When the cost asymmetry is large (c > c2), the mix-and-match effect becomes
insignificant and social welfare is mainly affected by the production-efficiency ef-
fect. In this case, however, production is more efficient under compatibility, with
more intense price competition and smaller market shares of the less efficient firm.
Also observe that consumers are better off under incompatibility (compatibility)
when the cost asymmetry is small (large) (see Figure 2). This is mainly because the
price effect is stronger than the mix-and-match effect.
Combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we obtain the following result on the social desir-
ability of the market equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1 In the consensus case, the market equilibrium involves socially
excessive compatibility for c ∈ (c1, c∗E) and socially excessive incompatibility for
c ∈ (c2,3). Similarly, in the adapter case, there is excess compatibility for c ∈ (c1, c2)
and excess incompatibility for c ∈ (c∗I , 3).
Proposition 1 clearly shows that, unlike the standard result obtained in the sym-
metric setup, the market incentive for compatibility may diverge from the social
optimum in the system market served by asymmetric firms, regardless of the mech-
anism by which compatibility is attained. For instance, in the consensus case for
c1 < c < c
∗
E the firms prefer compatibility, leading to softer price competition due to
the imperfect-appropriation effect, but it involves too much inefficient production by
the high-cost firm. Conversely, for c > c2 the firms favor incompatibility, with less
intense competition due to the market-boundary effect, while social welfare would
be larger under compatibility, with more efficient production. A similar pattern
emerges in the adapter case.
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Figure 2
Equilibrium Comparison between the Two Regimes (V = 10)
Excess incompatibility for a large degree of cost asymmetry is mainly driven by
the market-boundary effect, and so the validity of this result generally depends on the
distribution of consumers in the product space.10 Nevertheless we can easily see that
such a result will emerge provided the consumer distribution is more concentrated
in the middle under incompatibility than under compatibility, as in the present unit-
square distribution. It should be noted, however, that the excess-compatibility result
is quite robust with respect to the shape of the consumer distribution, and thus
deserves more attention in the arena of public policy.
4 Shared Cost Leadership
We now analyze the case where cost leadership is shared between the two firms
across components. Suppose that firm 1 produces component A more efficiently,
and conversely for component B. It is assumed that for each firm the marginal
production cost is c > 0 for the component it produces inefficiently and zero for the
one it produces efficiently.
Under compatibility, each firm’s profit-maximization problem, which is separable
in components, is the same as the one we analyzed in the complete-leadership case
10 The excess-incompatibility result would disappear if the consumer distribution
were such that the market boundary was more or less the same for compatibility and
for incompatibility, as in the case of the octagon distribution analyzed in the supple-
mentary material.
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Figure 3
Private and Social Incentives for Compatibility
(except for changing the firm indices for component A).11 Under incompatibility,
however, competition is essentially between two system providers with the same
production cost c. The equilibrium values in the two regimes are summarized in
Table 2.
Table 2
Equilibrium Values for the Case of Shared Cost Leadership
Incompatibility Compatibility
Pe1 = Pe2 = 1 + c peA1 = peB2 = 1 + c3 , peA2 = peB1 = 1 + 2c3
s1 = s2 = 12 sA1 = sB2 = 12 + c6 , sA2 = sB1 = 12 − c6
π IN1 = π IN2 = 12 πC1 = πC2 = 1 + c
2
9
CSIN = V − c − 53 CSC = V − c + c
2
18 − 52
W IN = V − c − 23 WC = V − c + 518 c2 − 12
Comparing the two equilibria yields the following result.
PROPOSITION 2 Under shared cost leadership, the firms prefer compatibility and it
is socially desirable as well. Consumers, however, are worse off under compatibility.
With shared cost leadership, the market-boundary effect vanishes, since the mar-
ket boundary under incompatibility is constant at its maximum length, independent
11 Again, we focus on the case where both firms are active in equilibrium (i.e.,
c ≤ 3).
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of the degree of cost asymmetry (the two firms are essentially symmetric system
suppliers). So, the firms’ price-cutting incentive is affected only by the imperfect-
appropriation effect, and therefore the price competition will be less intense under
compatibility. Then, assuming sequential plays in the first stage (either firm moves
first), compatibility is clearly the unique perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game.
Also worth noting is that the firms’ profits under compatibility increase with the
degree of cost asymmetry, while their profits under incompatibility are constant.
This is because for a larger c the efficient firm is less eager to capture the rival’s
customers, who are far from its location, and with strategic complementarity the
inefficient firm also tends to raise its price. Here compatibility also increases pro-
duction efficiency by allowing the firms to specialize in the component they produce
efficiently. Finally, note that the asymmetry-enhancing effect is neutralized in this
case of shared cost leadership.
To understand the welfare result, recall that with symmetric firms social welfare
is larger under compatibility. Under shared cost leadership, compatibility is even
more desirable, because it allows for efficient production. So, social welfare must
be larger under compatibility than under incompatibility. This efficient production
effect due to specialization dominates the mix-and-match effect as the degree of cost
asymmetry increases. Consumers, however, becomes worse off under compatibility.
The benefit from the mix-and-match effect is dominated by the loss from higher
prices with compatibility.
5 Independent Component Suppliers
In this section, we examine the case where the market is served by four independent
component suppliers rather than two integrated firms. Suppose that each compon-
ent market is supplied by two firms producing differentiated products. We index
individual firms by zi (z = A, B, i = 1, 2), and assume that firms A1 and B1 are
located at (0, 0) and firms A2 and B2 at (1,1) on the unit square. In this setup, we
investigate whether any two suppliers of complementary components have incen-
tives to form an exclusive alliance making their components compatible only with
the alliance partner.12 With only two suppliers for each component, if an alliance is
formed, it immediately enforces incompatibility between the components supplied
by the members of the alliance and those supplied by outsiders, leading to system
competition between two integrated systems. We consider a two-stage game where
the firms first decide whether to form an exclusive alliance (which is irreversible),
12 One may wonder if the firms have incentives to merge instead of forming an
alliance. But a merger would be less profitable than the technological alliance, since
it would reduce the joint profit of the two firms due to the internalization of com-
plementarity. Note that, however, merger incentives may exist among three firms if
the merging entity intends to monopolize the whole market by tying and foreclosing
the remaining component supplier. We do not intend to explore this topic, which has
been actively pursued by numerous authors (see Whinston, 1990, Choi and Stefanadis,
2001, and Carlton and Waldman, 2002, among others).
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and then compete in price independently. It is assumed that forming an alliance
requires a bilateral agreement between participants.
Note that with separate ownership there is no difference in the degree of inter-
nalization of complementarity between compatibility and incompatibility, which
sharply contrasts with the previous case of integrated firms. In fact, as shown by
Matutes and Regibeau (1988), in the symmetric setup the price-cutting incentive
is exactly the same under the compatibility and incompatibility equilibria, and
therefore the firms have no incentives to form alliances. An interesting question
is, however, whether the indifference result is still valid in the presence of cost
asymmetry among firms. Suppose two firms supplying component z (z = A, B)
have different marginal costs of production: c > 0 for the inefficient and 0 for the
efficient firm. Without loss of generality, we assume that the firms located at (0,0),
A1 and B1, are inefficient and those located at (1, 1), A2 and B2, are efficient. Note
that, given the symmetric consumer preferences across components, this setup is
qualitatively equivalent to the case of two asymmetric firms located at the same
location; e.g., A1 and B2 are inefficient and B1 and A2 are efficient.
Equilibria under Different Alliance Structures. There are two types of alliances we
need to consider. One is the case where two efficient firms (A2/B2) form an alliance
making their components incompatible with those offered by two inefficient firms
(A1/B1). The other is the case where two symmetric alliances are formed, each
consisting of one efficient firm and one inefficient firm (A1/B2 and A2/B1). It is
easy to see that the latter type of alliances will not be observed in equilibrium. The
efficient firms will not ally with an inefficient firm, given that their cost advantage
is unilaterally passed through to the inefficient partner due to complementarity
between components. Also, such alliances would intensify price competition by
making two system suppliers more symmetric. So we focus on the former type of
alliances.
Under the alliances, competition is between two incompatible systems. Con-
sumers who are indifferent between the systems are characterized by
x1 + x2 + pA1 + pB1 ≤ 2 − x1 − x2 + pA2 + pB2 ,
where pzi is the component price set by firm zi (z = A, B, i = 1,2). For pA1 + pB1 ≥
pA2 + pB2, the demands and profits are
DA1/B1 = 12
(
1 − pA1 + pB1 − (pA2 + pB2)
2
)2
,
DA2/B2 = 1 − 12
(
1 − pA1 + pB1 − (pA2 + pB2)
2
)2
,
πz1 = 12 (pz1 − c)
(
1 − pA1 + pB1 − (pA2 + pB2)
2
)2
,
πz2 = pz2
[
1 − 1
2
(
1 − pA1 + pB1 − (pA2 + pB2)
2
)2]
.
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Table 3
Equilibrium Values for the Case of Independent Component Suppliers
Alliance (incompatibility) No alliance (compatibility)
pez1 = 56 c + 16 + 16
√
c2 − 2c + 25 pez1 = 1 + 2c3
pez2 = 23 c − 23 + 13
√
c2 − 2c + 25 pez2 = 1 + c3
sz1 = 172
(
1 − c + √c2 − 2c + 25)2 sz1 = 12 − c6
sz2 = 1 − sz1 sz2 = 1 − sz1
πAz1 = 1432
(
1 − c + √c2 − 2c + 25)3 πNAz1 = 12 (1 − c3 )2
πAz2 =
1
108
(
2c − 2 + √c2 − 2c + 25)
×(23 + 2c − c2 + (c − 1)√c2 − 2c + 25) πNAz2 = 12
(
1 + c3
)2
CSA = V −
1
162
[
c3 − 3c2 + 237c − 73
−(c2 − 2c − 101)√c2 − 2c + 25] CSNA = V − c + c
2
18 − 52
W A = V −
1
162
[
7c3 − 21c2 + 93c + 83
−(7c2 − 14c − 5)√c2 − 2c + 25] W NA = V − c + 518 c2 − 12
Individual firms choose their price independently to maximize profits, and the
equilibrium can be easily characterized from the first-order conditions.
Without alliances, compatibility prevails and the competition is component versus
component. Then, the equilibrium is exactly the same as in the previous complete-
cost-leadership case with two integrated firms (except that an individual firm’s
profit is halved).13 The equilibrium values under the two regimes are summarized
in Table 3.
Private and Social Incentives for Exclusive Alliances (Incompatibility). Let us now
examine the firms’ first-stage alliance decision. Comparing the two equilibria above,
we can easily see that the alliance (incompatibility) yields larger profits for all firms
(π Azi ≥ πNAzi for z = A, B, i = 1, 2, where equality holds only for c = 0). So, all firms
will prefer alliance (incompatibility) rather than independent competition (compat-
ibility). This is mainly because the market boundary is shorter and therefore price
competition is less intense under the alliances than under independent competition.
For instance, the equilibrium price of a component supplied by an inefficient firm
is higher under the alliance than under independent competition, and the price dif-
ference becomes larger as the degree of cost asymmetry increases, as depicted in
Figure 4.
With cost asymmetry, the efficient component suppliers have incentives to form
an exclusive alliance.14
13 We assume that c ≤ 3 to ensure no cornering in equilibrium.
14 Note that if the degree of product differentiation differs between the two compo-
nents (i.e., λA = λB), the efficient supplier of the more differentiated component may
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Figure 4
Equilibrium Prices under Alliances and Independent Competition
Consumers are, however, worse off under the alliances. Prices are higher under
the alliances. System variety is also decreased under the alliances unless c is very
large (see consumer gross utility (GU) in Figure 5). Even if c is large enough so that
system variety is higher under the alliances, the price effect dominates the variety-
increasing effect. Total welfare is also smaller under the alliance, since it involves
too little product variety when c is small and too much inefficient production when c
is large.
Figure 5
Gross Utilities, Average System Prices, and Total Costs (V = 10)
LEMMA 3 Consumer surplus and social welfare are both larger with independent
competition without alliances.
PROPOSITION 3 With independent component suppliers with asymmetric costs,
incompatibility prevails in the market in the form of exclusive alliances, but it is
socially undesirable.
go against alliance, unless the cost asymmetry is sufficiently large. There exists a se-
rious imperfect-appropriation problem due to complementarity under alliance. So, he
would rather choose to enjoy the full benefit of the high degree of product differenti-
ation without alliance.
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The efficient component suppliers enforce incompatibility in the market through
exclusive technological alliances. This alliance structure, however, reduces social
welfare by restraining consumers from mixing and matching their preferred com-
ponents for small cost asymmetry, and by reducing production efficiencies for large
cost asymmetry. Note that this is a new finding, which has not been addressed in the
previous works.
6 Robustness and Extensions
We have seen that the market-boundary effect played a crucial role in part of the
analysis. In particular, the validity of some results critically relied upon the shape of
the consumer distribution in the product space. So, it is important to clarify which
results are dependent on the assumption of the unit-square distribution, and examine
how these are affected by the change of the consumer preference distribution. The
most notable conclusion is that the excess-incompatibility result is sensitive to the
shape of the consumer preference distribution, and will not be observed if the market
boundary is the same under compatibility and incompatibility. In the supplementary
appendix, we analyze the case of consumers being uniformly distributed on the
regular octagon, and find that the inefficient firm always prefers compatibility,
regardless of the degree of cost asymmetry, and therefore excess incompatibility
never occurs even in the adapter case.15 Nevertheless, it is unfair to ignore the market-
boundary effect simply because of this sort of robustness problem. On the contrary,
the market-boundary effect arises whenever consumers are more concentrated in
the middle under incompatibility than under compatibility. More important is the
fact that this market-boundary effect is activated by asymmetries between firms, and
also reinforced by the asymmetry-enhancing effect under incompatibility. Finally,
we would emphasize that the excess-compatibility result is robust irrespective of
the shape of the consumer distribution.
Also we need to check the robustness of our results with respect to several
modeling assumptions, in particular those of consumers’ full participation and unit
demands. First, to examine what happens if partial participation is allowed, we need
to analyze the cases of local monopolies and partial competition as in Matutes and
Regibeau (1988). Unfortunately, however, it turns out that it is too complicated to
fully characterize equilibria of those cases under cost asymmetry. For instance, if
the market is not fully covered, the demands for different firms’ components are
connected to each other in a very complex way under compatibility, while those
relationships become quite straightforward in a fully covered market. It is easily
conjectured that with partial participation firms’ incentives for compatibility tend to
increase. The additional demand-shifting effect under partial participation, induced
by the increased variety under compatibility, raises the firms’ incentives for com-
15 Note that the octagon distribution is qualitatively similar to the unit disk and the
multivariate standard normal distributions in that the market-boundary effect is neutral-
ized under compatibility and incompatibility.
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Table 4
Equilibrium Profits under the Two Regimes for V = 2.5
π IN1 π
IN
2 π
C
1 π
C
2
c = 0 0.5 0.5 0.7763 0.7763
c = 0.1 0.4522 0.5863 0.6732 0.7916
c = 0.2 0.4085 0.6782 0.5756 0.8061
c = 0.3 0.3687 0.7756 0.4839 0.8195
c = 0.4 0.3325 0.8782 0.3986 0.8317
c = 0.5 0.2996 0.9858 0.3202 0.8421
c = 0.6 0.2698 1.0981 0.2492 0.8506
c = 0.7 0.2429 1.215 0.186 0.8568
patibility, while the influence of the market-boundary effect becomes smaller, since
the difference in the length of market boundaries between compatibility and incom-
patibility is less significant with partial participation than with full participation.
Nevertheless, using numerical analyses, we were able to find that incompatibility
may be adopted in the market provided the degree of asymmetry is sufficiently large.
For example, comparing the two firms’ profits under the two regimes for V = 2.5
shows that both firms prefer compatibility for c ≤ 0.3, the efficient firm favors in-
compatibility for c ≥ 0.4, and even the inefficient firm prefers incompatibility for
c ≥ 0.6 (see Table 4). Note that here incompatibility induces direct competition,
while compatibility still allows for partial participation.
Second, in order to check whether our results are robust to other demand spe-
cifications, we extended the model to the case of the same linear multiple demand
structure as in Matutes and Regibeau (1988). In this setup, a consumer located at
some point in the unit square is assumed to buy X = V − s(dAi + dB j + Pij) units
of the system at the lowest total effective price dAi + dB j + Pij . Note that with this
demand specification the demand-shifting effect due to increased variety under
compatibility persists even when the whole market is covered, and so it is more
likely for firms to prefer compatibility. It turns out, however, that the efficient firm
may still choose to make its components incompatible with the inefficient rival’s
for a large degree of cost asymmetry, as shown in Figure 6, which depicts the effi-
cient (above) and inefficient (below) firms’ profits as a function of c for the case of
V = 10 and s = 1. We have found qualitatively similar results for numerous exam-
ples with different values of V and s, i.e., the efficient firm favors incompatibility
for a large c. This shows that the asymmetry-enhancing and market-boundary ef-
fects can jointly dominate the imperfect-appropriation and demand-shifting effects
with a large degree of cost asymmetry. Another interesting result is that with mul-
tiple demands, compatibility has an adverse effect on consumers and total welfare
because of the double marginalization, which reduces individuals’ consumption
quantities.
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Figure 6
Firm Profits, Consumer Surplus, and Social Welfare for V = 10 and s = 1
7 Conclusion
The early works on mix-and-match compatibility in system markets predict that
compatibility prevails in the market and is also socially desirable. In this paper, we
have shown that the result may change when firms competing in the market are
asymmetric. In particular, if one system supplier has cost (or quality) advantages
in both components (complete cost leadership), the market equilibrium tends to
involve too much compatibility. The market outcome may also yield too much
incompatibility if the distribution of consumer preferences is subject to the market-
boundary effect and the degree of asymmetry is sufficiently large. When the market
is served by independent component suppliers with different costs, incompatibility
prevails in the form of exclusive technological alliances although social welfare
would be higher with compatibility (i.e., no alliance formation).
Our analysis sheds new light on public policy. Competition authorities in many
countries tend be lenient on (or even foster) firms’ attempts to achieving compati-
bility in system markets. Our results cast doubt on this positive attitude, and suggest
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that policymakers need to be aware that compatibility may not be desirable when
competing firms are asymmetric. Also, we need to be more suspicious of exclusive
technological alliances between independent component suppliers, which tend to
yield less competitive market outcomes by enforcing incompatibility among com-
ponents across alliances. Overall, we need to be more careful in designing public
policies in system markets, taking account of the specifics of the corresponding
industry.
Given that incompatibility can be reinterpreted as bundling of two complemen-
tary products, the present analysis also offers a new perspective on product bundling
and entry deterrence, which somewhat differs from the standard foreclosure argu-
ment à la Whinston (1990). In our model, incompatibility (exclusive alliances) is
used as a semicollusive device rather than a foreclosing device, and so it is more
closely related to the facilitating-device story where bundling relaxes competition
by allowing competing firms to better differentiate themselves (see Carbajo, De
Meza, and Seidman, 1990; Seidman, 1991; Chen, 1997; and Denicolo, 2000).16
This line of research usually examines the case where only one firm bundles and
the other sells only one component, while we consider cases where all firms are
active in equilibrium, selling their components or systems. Our result also points
out the possibility that a dominant firm uses compatibility as an entry-deterring
(or exit-inducing) device when entry incurs fixed costs. Since the inefficient firm’s
profit is smaller under compatibility than under incompatibility for an intermediate
range of asymmetry, the efficient incumbent may strategically choose to enforce
compatibility as a commitment to aggressive pricing in case of entry. This contrasts
with the standard case where incompatibility is used as an entry-deterring device,
as noted by Tirole (1988) and Nalebuff (2004). A related work on this point is that
of Matutes and Regibeau (1989). They consider a setup where an incumbent firm
produces one component of a two-component system and there are two incompat-
ible versions of the second component, and show that the incumbent may wish to
make its product compatible with two versions of the second component in order to
limit the scope of entry in the first-component market.
Supplementary Appendix
In this appendix, we check whether the excess-compatibility and/or the excess-
incompatibility result still holds under circumstances where the market boundaries
are similar under compatibility and incompatibility and so the market-boundary
effect is neutral between the two regimes. For that purpose, we analyze the case
where a continuum of consumers of mass 1 are uniformly distributed on the regular
octagon of side length l = 1/
√
2(1 + √2). Consumers have horizontally differen-
tiated preferences for the components produced by the two firms. In the market
16 See also Choi (1996), who shows that bundling (incompatibility) may be used as
a commitment device reducing R&D competition in asymmetric system markets.
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there are the two integrated system suppliers with horizontally differentiated com-
ponents. Assume that firm 1’s system is located at the origin and firm 2’s system at
(
√
(1 + √2)/2,
√
(1 + √2)/2) (i.e., maximal differentiation for each component).
Note that this setup is useful to evaluate the pure effect of cost asymmetry,
being isolated from the bias induced by the shape of the consumer preference
distribution. Unlike in the case of the unit-square distribution, the two firms face the
same consumer distribution under compatibility and incompatibility, and therefore
the firms’ incentives are not affected by the distributional bias under this octagon
distribution (see Figure A1).17
Figure A1
Densities of Market Boundary under Compatibility and Incompatibility
Now we characterize equilibria of the games between the two firms postulated in
the main text under incompatibility and compatibility, and compare the private and
social incentives for compatibility.
System Competition under Incompatibility. As we have seen in the main text, when
the components produced by different firms are incompatible, the competition is
system versus system, and what matters to consumers in their purchasing decision
is the aggregate price of a system. A consumer located at (xA, xB) will be indifferent
17 Alternatively, one may assume that consumers are distributed on the unit disk,
which has exactly the same property as the regular octagon in that the market bound-
ary does not change with the choice of compatibility or incompatibility. Unfortunately,
however, solving for equilibria in this case is technically demanding. We strongly be-
lieve the qualitative results would not change with this distributional modification.
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between two systems if
xA + xB + P1 =
√
2(1 + √2) − xA − xB + P2 ,
where Pi represents the price of firm i’s system (see Figure A2).
We need to consider two cases, depending on the difference in the system prices
offered by the two firms, due to the kink in the octagon-shaped distribution. Each
firm’s demand is given by
D1(P1, P2) = 12
[
1 −
√
1 + √2
2
(P1 − P2)
]
,
D2(P1, P2) = 12
[
1 −
√
1 + √2
2
(P2 − P1)
]
if the price differential is small, and
D1(P1, P2) = 14
[√
1 + √2 − P1 − P2√
2
]2
−
√
2 − 1
8
,
D2(P1, P2) = 7 +
√
2
8
− 1
4
[√
1 + √2 − P1 − P2√
2
]2
if it is large.
Solving the profit-maximization problem of each firm, the first-order conditions
leads to the following equilibrium prices and profits:
Pe1 = 2
√√
2 − 1 + 4
3
c , π IN1 =
(
3 −
√
1 + √2c)2
9
√
1 + √2
,
Pe2 = 2
√√
2 − 1 + 2
3
c , π IN2 =
(
3 +
√
1 + √2c)2
9
√
1 + √2
for c ≤ 3/(2
√√
2 + 1) 	 0.9654, and
Pe1 =
√
2
√
2 + 2(8√2 − 3)
56 −
(
8
√
2 − 59)c
28
+
(
57
√
2 − 32)Φ
6664 ,
Pe2 =
(
16 − 45√2)√√2 + 1 + (90 − 16√2)c + √2Φ
56
,
π IN1 = (Pe1 − 2c)
[(833√√2 + 1 − 833√2c + (31 + 8√2)Φ
6664
)2
−
√
2 − 1
8
]
,
π IN2 = Pe2
[
1 +
√
2 − 1
8
−
(833√√2 + 1 − 833√2c + (31 + 8√2)Φ
6664
)2]
for
3/
(
2
√√
2 + 1
)
≤ c ≤ 1
2
(√
2
√
2 + 2 +
√
17
√
2 + 7
)
	 3.8844 ,
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where
Φ =
[
(2178 − 992√2)c2 − (2178√2 − 1984)
√√
2 + 1c + 9197 − 1003√2
] 1
2
.
Component Competition with Compatibility. When the components produced by
the two firms are compatible with each other, the competition is component versus
component. Consumers who are indifferent between the two firms’ components are
characterized by
xz + pz1 =
√
1 + √2
2
− xz + pz2 ,
where pzi represents the price of firm i’s component z (i = 1, 2, z = A, B) (see
Figure A2).
We consider two cases, depending on the difference in the two firms’ component
prices. Each firm’s demand for component z is
Dz1(pz1, pz2) = 12
[
1 −
√
1 + √2
2
(pz1 − pz2)
]
,
Dz2(pz1, pz2) = 12
[
1 −
√
1 + √2
2
(pz2 − pz1)
]
Figure A2
Equilibrium Market Configurations under Compatibility and Incompatibility
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if the price differential is small, and
Dz1(pzi, pz j) =
[√
1 + √2
2
− pz1 − pz2
2
]2
−
√
2 − 1
8
,
Dz2(pzi, pz j) = 7 +
√
2
8
−
[√
1 + √2
2
− pz1 − pz2
2
]2
if it is large.
Solving the profit-maximization problems, the equilibrium prices and profits are
given as
pez1 =
√
2
√
2 − 2 + 2c
3
, πC1 =
(
6 −
√
2
√
2 + 2c)2
18
√
2
√
2 + 2
,
pez2 =
√
2
√
2 − 2 + c
3
, πC2 =
(
6 +
√
2
√
2 + 2c)2
18
√
2
√
2 + 2
for
c ≤ 6
√
(
√
2 + 1)/(4√2 + 6) − 3
√
1/(2
√
2 + 2) 	 1.3653 ,
and
pez1 =
(
8
√
2 − 3)√√2 + 1
56
−
(
8
√
2 − 59)c
56
+
(
57 − 16√2)Ω
6664
,
pez2 =
(
8
√
2 − 45)√√2 + 1 + (45 − 8√2)c + Ω
56
,
πC1 = 2(pez1 − c)
[(833√√2 + 1 − 833c + (31 + 8√2)Ω
6664
)2
−
√
2 − 1
8
]
,
πC2 = 2pez2
[
1 +
√
2 − 1
8
−
(833√√2 + 1 − 833c + (31 + 8√2)Ω
6664
)2]
for
6
√
(
√
2 + 1)/(4√2 + 6) − 3
√
1/(2
√
2 + 2) ≤ c ≤
√
7/2 + 17/√2 +
√√
2 + 1
	 5.4934 ,
where
Ω =
[
(1089 − 496√2)c2 − (2178 − 992√2)
√√
2 + 1 c + 9197 − 1003√2
] 1
2
.
Firms’ Incentive for Compatibility. Comparing the firms’ equilibrium profits under
compatibility and incompatibility, we have the following result. In order to focus on
the situations where both firms are active in the market, we confine our analysis to
the case of c < 3.8844.
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LEMMA A1 The efficient firm (firm 2) prefers compatibility for c < c∗ 	 1.78 and
incompatibility for c > c∗, while the inefficient firm (firm 1) always prefers compat-
ibility to incompatibility.
Not surprisingly, the firms have a common interest in achieving compatibil-
ity when the cost differential is sufficiently small (c < c∗). When the degree of
cost asymmetry is sufficiently large (c > c∗), however, the efficient firm prefers
incompatibility while the inefficient still prefers compatibility. Note that without
the market-boundary effect the firms’ incentives for compatibility are solely deter-
mined by the interplay of the imperfect-appropriation and asymmetry-enhancing
effects. As shown in Figure A3, when the degree of asymmetry is large (c > c∗),
the asymmetry-enhancing effect is stronger than the imperfect-appropriation effect,
inducing the efficient firm to opt for incompatibility.
Figure A3
Each Firm’s Profit Gain Due to Compatibility Relative to Incompatibility
(
πCi − π INi
)
Social Desirability for Compatibility. Using the equilibrium prices and profits
obtained above, we can calculate consumer surplus and total welfare under incom-
patibility and compatibility as follows:
CSIN =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
V − 2.0464 − c + 0.0863c2 for c ≤ 0.9654 ,
V + 0.3961 − 1.3901c + 0.0687c2 − 0.0208c3
+ (0.0208c2 − 0.0458c − 0.6578)Γ1 for 0.9654 ≤ c ≤ 3.8844 ,
W IN =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
V − 0.7593 − c + 0.4316c2 for c ≤ 0.9654 ,
V − 0.7767 − 0.4741c + 0.2747c2 − 0.0833c3
+ (0.0833c2 − 0.1831c + 0.0086)Γ1 for 0.9654 ≤ c ≤ 3.8844 ,
CSC =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
V − 2.4390 − c + 0.0610c2 for c ≤ 1.3653 ,
V + 1.0152 − 1.3906c + 0.0486c2 − 0.0104c3
+ (0.0104c2 − 0.0324c − 0.6578)Γ2 for 1.3653 ≤ c ≤ 5.4934 ,
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WC =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
V − 0.6187 − c + 0.3052c2 for c ≤ 1.3653 ,
V − 0.6432 − 0.4741c + 0.1942c2 − 0.0417c3
+ (0.0417c2 − 0.1295c + 0.0086)Γ2 for 1.3653 ≤ c ≤ 5.4934 ,
where Γ1 =
√
10.0355 − 2.1974c + c2 and Γ2 =
√
20.0711 − 3.1076c + c2.
Comparing social welfare under the two regimes leads to the following result.
LEMMA A2 Social welfare is larger under compatibility for c < cs 	 1.1, and under
incompatibility for c > cs.
Figure A4
Consumer Surplus and Total Welfare under Incompatibility and Compatibility (V = 10)
In order to get some insight into this result, it is useful to decompose the total
welfare into consumer gross utility (GU), average system price (AP), and total
production cost (TC) (see Figure A5). First, compatibility, by allowing mixing
and matching, reduces consumers’ transportation costs and leads to larger gross
utilities. This mix-and-match effect is stronger when the market is more equally
divided in equilibrium (i.e., the cost asymmetry is small), and gets smaller as the
degree of cost asymmetry increases. Second, the average system price (weighted
by the equilibrium market shares) tends to be higher under compatibility, due to
the imperfect-appropriation effect. Third, given a fully covered market, production
efficiency, measured by the total production cost, is solely related to how the total
production is allocated between the firms in equilibrium. As noted earlier, the effi-
cient firm enjoys a larger market share under incompatibility than under compatibil-
ity, and more importantly, its relative market share increases as the cost asymmetry
increases. So, production efficiency tends to be higher under incompatibility than
under compatibility.
System Variety versus Production Efficiency. Let us consider the two-stage game
where each firm first decides whether to make its components compatible with
its rival’s, and the two then compete in price, given the first-stage compatibility
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Figure A5
Consumer Gross Utility (V = 10), Average System Price, and Total Production Cost
decisions. The first-stage compatibility choices are assumed to be irreversible. As
before, we consider two mechanisms by which compatibility is attained in the
market, viz., the consensus case and the adapter case. Solving for a perfect Nash
equilibrium, we obtain the following result, which is immediate from Lemma A1.
LEMMA A3 In the unique perfect Nash equilibrium of the two-stage game, (i) com-
patibility (incompatibility) is achieved for c ≤ c∗ 	 1.78 (c ≥ c∗) in the consensus
case, and (ii) compatibility always prevails in the adapter case.
Combining Lemmas A2 and A3 leads to the following proposition on the social
desirability of the market equilibrium.
PROPOSITION A The market equilibrium involves socially excessive compatibility
for c ∈ (cs, c∗) in the consensus case, and for c ∈ (cs,∞) in the adapter case.
This result clearly shows that excess compatibility can happen in system markets
even without the market-boundary effect. So, the market incentive for compatibility
can diverge from the social optimum, regardless of the consumers’ taste distribution
and the mechanism by which compatibility is attained.
Figure A6
Private and Social Incentives for Compatibility
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